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RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW SYMPOSIUM
Ukraine v. Russia: Passage
through Kerch Strait and the
Sea of Azov
Part II: Ukraine’s Rights of Passage through Kerch Strait
In our previous post, we have taken a look at the legal status of the Sea
of Azov and concluded that there are two possible Scenarios involving
either a shared bay regime of internal waters or a “standard” situation
in which the Sea of Azov is divided into the territorial seas of Russia
and Ukraine in addition to a high seas pocket in the centre (see Picture
3).  Based  on  these  conclusions,  the  present  post  undertakes  a
preliminary review of Ukraine’s rights of passage through Kerch Strait
in light of recent restrictions imposed by Russia.
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Picture 3: Maritime boundaries in the Sea of Azov in accordance with a
normal  territorial  sea  regime  (potential  contiguous  zone/EEZ
/continental  shelf  claims  remain  undelimited)  (Source:
http://opennauticalchart.org/).
Russian Restrictions  on  Passage  related  to  the  Construction  of  Kerch
Strait Bridge
From 2015 onwards it was reported that Russia, which now controls
both  banks  of  Kerch  Strait,  made  Ukrainian  vessels  subject  to  an
authorization requirement for passage through the Kerch Strait. The
situation  escalated  further  after  the  adoption  of  an  Order  of  the
Russian  Ministry  of  Transport  of  7  July  2017  which  enables  the
competent  Russian  authorities  to  deny  any  vessels  except  Russian
warships access to the Sea of Azov during certain specified time spans.
Russia explains the ban with the ongoing construction of Kerch Strait
Bridge  (see  video  here).  On  25  August  2017,  Kerch  Port  Authority
announced a  closure based on the new Order for  a  period of  time
between 27-30 August 2017, which was cancelled on 29 August 2017. It
applied to all ships except Russian military ships and ships involved in
the construction works. Another closure was announced on 9 October
2017 for a time period between 11-14 October 2017 and cancelled on 13
October 2017.
In  addition,  Kerch  Strait  Bridge  will  impose  physical  restraints  on
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navigation.  Reportedly,  the  maximum  measurements  of  vessels
wanting to pass underneath the bridge are 160 m (length), 31 m (width)
and 33 m (height), with a maximum draft of 8 m. The administration of
the  sea  ports  of  Ukraine  claims  that  the  average  measurements  of
vessels that visit the largest Ukrainian port in the Sea of Azov, namely,
the  port  of  Mariupol,  which  is  important  for  the  Ukrainian  metal
industry, are 175 m (length) and 27 m (width), with a maximum draft of
9.6 m. Allegedly, there used to be frequent visits by Panamax type ships
as big as 225 m (length),  32.5 m (width)  and 37.5 m (height),  with a
maximum draft of 14 m (the largest vessel which ever entered the port
of Mariupol reportedly measured 235 m (length), 38 m (width) and 49 m
(height), with a maximum draft of 14.5 m). This data, if correct, would
show that the construction of Kerch Strait Bridge will  likely  restrict
access to Ukrainian ports in the Sea of Azov. As a result, the Ukrainian
economy is expected to suffer considerable losses.
Unsurprisingly,  Ukraine  protested  against  these  measures  and
considers  Russia’s  unilateral  change  of  navigational  rules  in  Kerch
Strait and denial of access to the Sea of Azov for Ukrainian ships as a
violation  of  international  law.  On  25  November  2016,  Ukraine  and
Georgia (for background, see here) submitted a document concerning
“Safety  and security  of  navigation in  the North-Eastern part  of  the
Black Sea” to the Maritime Safety Committee of IMO, which has since
agreed to monitor the situation.  Ukraine reportedly  also  intends  to
submit  further  complaints  to  IMO about  the temporary closures  of
Kerch Strait in 2017.
Warship 'Azov' sails under section of new Crimean bridge
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“Warship ‘Azov’ sails under section of new Crimean bridge” (Source: RT,
Youtube). Embedded for visualization only.
Ukraine’s Rights of Passage
This  begs  the  question  whether  the  Russian  measures  violate  any
rights of Ukraine concerning passage through Kerch Strait. If no such
rights existed for the vessels of Ukraine (and third States), all Ukrainian
ports in the Sea of Azov would effectively be “locked in” (if not, strictly
speaking,  “land-locked”)  and lose much of  their  economic potential.
There appear to be at  least  four issues which deserve attention:  (1)
Ukraine’s  rights  in  its  internal  waters  or  territorial  sea,  (2)  the
Cooperation  Agreement,  (3)  the  1997  Treaty  on  Friendship,
Cooperation  and  Partnership  Between  Ukraine  and  the  Russian
Federation  (FCN-Treaty),  and  (4)  passage  rights  under  Part  III  of
UNCLOS and/or customary international law. The following analysis
takes note of both possible Scenarios for the legal status of the Sea of
Azov  and  Kerch  Strait  introduced  in  Part  I  of  this  contribution
(Scenario  1:    internal  waters;  Scenario  2:  territorial  sea  and  high
seas/EEZ).
First, assuming that the territorial status of Crimea as part of Ukraine
remains unchanged, any exercise of coastal State rights by Russia in
the internal waters or territorial sea of Crimea in Kerch Strait is an
illegal  usurpation  of  Ukraine’s  sovereignty  as  the  coastal  State.  In
Scenario  2,  Ukraine’s  coastal  State  rights  in  its  territorial  sea  arise
directly from Part II of UNCLOS. In Scenario 1, however, the situation is
more complex. Despite Article 2(1) UNCLOS, which acknowledges the
coastal State’s sovereignty in its “land territory and internal waters”,
the predominant view (which has been challenged)  is  that  “internal
waters in principle are not covered by [UNCLOS] but by customary
international  law”  (ITLOS,  The  “ARA  Libertad”  Case  (Argentina  v.
Ghana), Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Wolfrum and Cot, paras. 23
ff.).  It  arguably  follows  that  this  is  a  violation  of  customary
international law only. Interestingly, claims based on Ukraine’s coastal
State rights would most closely align with the title under which the
PCA registered the dispute (“Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights
in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait”).
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Second,  the  Cooperation  Agreement  affords  Russian  and  Ukrainian
merchant vessels, warships, and State ships flying the flag of Russia or
Ukraine “freedom of navigation” in the Sea of Azov and in Kerch Strait
(Article 2(1)). While this terminology resembles Article 87(1)(a) UNCLOS,
this  similarity  is  probably  accidental  as  this  wording  is  a  common
feature of treaties of friendship, navigation and commerce and is not
usually intended to grant a right of navigation as broad as that on the
high  seas.  However,  in  the  case  of  the  Cooperation  Agreement,  it
clearly  encompasses  a  right  of  passage,  be  it  similar  to  innocent
passage or transit passage. Foreign flagged commercial vessels, on the
other hand, are granted a right of passage through Kerch Strait and
the Sea of Azov only to navigate to a Russian or Ukrainian port (Article
2(2)). Foreign flagged warships and government vessels may only pass
through Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov upon invitation or permission
of Russia or Ukraine, subject to agreement by the other State (Article
2(3)).  Assuming  that  the  Cooperation  Agreement  is  still  in  force,
Ukraine seems to have – irrespective of the territorial status of Crimea
–  treaty-based  passage  rights  both  for  commercial  and  non-
commercial vessels. These rights also appear to exist irrespective of
whether Scenario 1 or Scenario 2 applies for the legal status of Kerch
Strait and the Sea of Azov.
Third, in accordance with Article 17 FCN-Treaty, Russia and Ukraine
“shall ensure the freedom of transit […] across each other’s territory in
accord  with  generally  recognized  norms  of  international  law.  The
conveyance of freight and passengers by […] sea […] between the two
Parties,  and  by  transit  across  their  territories,  including  operations
through  sea  […]  are  effected  in  the  manner  and  according  to  the
conditions  provided  by  separate  agreements”.  However,  as  is  also
confirmed by the preamble of the Cooperation Treaty, the FCN-Treaty
provides a framework for co-operation rather than passage rights of
its  own  and  would  arguably  only  be  breached  if  Russia  infringes
Ukraine’s  rights  of  passage under the Cooperation Treaty.  (There is
also a third bilateral treaty, namely the 2012 Agreement between the
Government of the Russian Federation and the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine on Measures to ensure the Safety of Navigation in the Sea of
Azov  and  the  Kerch  Strait,  of  which  we  provide  an  unofficial
translation here. However, does not grant passage rights but contains a
number  of  obligations  concerning  co-operation,  publicity  of  laws,
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notification, and data-exchange.)
Finally,  the  question  arises  whether  there  are  any  passage  rights
through Kerch Strait under UNCLOS and/or customary international
law.  Under  Scenario  1,  the  regime  of  transit  passage  pursuant  to
Articles  37  ff.  UNCLOS  is  not  applicable.  This  is  because  “straits
connecting high seas or EEZ to internal waters do not come within the
ambit of Part III”. The exception of Article 35(a) does not apply here as
a bay closing line under Article 10 is not a straight baseline within the
meaning of Article 8(2) UNCLOS (see here and here). This also excludes
non-suspendable  innocent  passage  under  Article  45(1)(b)  UNCLOS,
because that right only applies to straits which connect high seas/EEZ
and  the  territorial  sea  of  a  foreign  State.  The  provision  does  not
contemplate the sui generis  situation of a multi-State bay of shared
internal  waters.  Thus,  the  only  avenue  left  is  that  of  customary
international law. A common view is that “straits [which] in fact lead to
bays bordered by several States [are a] category of straits in which the
right  of  passage  has  long  been  recognized  by  customary  law”.  This
view, however, usually refers to multi-State bays which are not internal
waters  (i.e.  cases  of  Article  45(1)(b)  UNCLOS).  On  the  other  hand,
reference can once again be had to the ICJ’s 1992 judgment in the Land,
Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua
intervening), which stated that despite the status of the waters of the
Bay of Fonseca was as shared internal waters of El Salvador, Honduras
and Nicaragua, there was an “existing right of innocent passage” both
because of “historical reasons” and “practical necessities”.  Again, the
facts of that case were quite peculiar and uncertainty remains with
regard to a right of passage under Scenario 1. But it could be argued
that  the  Cooperation  Agreement  merely  acknowledges  pre-existing
passage rights based on consistent practice.
Under Scenario 2, however, the geographical criterion of a strait under
Article 37 UNCLOS or at least Article 45(1)(b) UNCLOS is fulfilled. This
is because there would be a high seas or EEZ patch in the Sea of Azov,
surrounded by the Ukrainian and Russian territorial sea (see Picture 3).
However, there is also a functional criterion which requires that Kerch
Strait is “used for international navigation”. The exact meaning of that
criterion remains somewhat obscure. It is recalled, in the context of
Kerch  Strait,  that  “the  fact  that  certain  straits  provide  access  to
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important ports, in itself, does not mean that these straits necessarily
attract the legal regime of international straits” (Bing Bing Jia, Article
37 UNCLOS, in: Alexander Proelss (ed.), United Nations Convention on
the  Law  of  the  Sea:  A  Commentary,  2017,  MN.  12).  Whether  Kerch
Strait, which is mainly used by Ukrainian and Russian ships, is “used for
international navigation” within the meaning of Article 37 UNCLOS, is
debatable.  Nonetheless,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  Cooperation
Agreement, with its restricted access for warships of third States, is a
“clear infringement of the right of passage in transit which should be
in force in the Kerch Strait”.  If  both the geographical and functional
criteria are met, Ukraine can claim a right of transit passage (Article
38(1) UNCLOS) or non-suspendable innocent passage (Article 45(1)(b)
UNCLOS) through Kerch Strait.
Preliminary Conclusion
It may be concluded that, under Scenario 1, Ukraine could potentially
invoke violations of its customary rights of coastal State sovereignty in
Crimea’s internal waters, as well as its rights of navigation under the
Cooperation Agreement (and perhaps additionally the FCN-Treaty) and
customary international law. Under Scenario 2, Ukraine can potentially
invoke,  in  addition  to  the  Cooperation  Agreement,  its  coastal  State
rights  in  the  territorial  Sea  of  Crimea  (Part  II  of  UNCLOS)  and,
potentially,  rights  of  transit  passage  or  non-suspendable  innocent
passage through Kerch Strait under Articles 38(1) or 45(1)(b) UNCLOS.
As we will show in Part III of this contribution, it is less clear whether
this multitude of potential claims as a matter of substantive law will
find its  way into  the jurisdiction ratione  materiae  of  the  Annex  VII
tribunal.
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